

Session I

Equality and Order in the Unification Ideal Society

Tyler Owen Hendricks

Ph. D. in Religion,
Vice President of HSA-UWC-USA, USA

Introduction

This essay comes under the category "History and Society," and relates to the chapter on "Ethics" in Unification Thought. In it I endeavor to develop the Unification Thought theory of social ethics as applied to the nature of society and form of government. The problem with which this essay will deal concerns the nature of the good society. The answer to this question relates directly to the definition of "good." On the one hand, "good" may be defined as "equality." On the other hand, it may be defined as "order." Contemporary democracy is the result of the ascendancy of "equality" as the ultimate value; traditional monarchism places a higher premium on "order." By "order," I mean stability, clarity of position and relationship, with attached roles, mutual obligations and so forth.

Normally this requires strong authority for its maintenance, and is susceptible toward abuse by those who have that authority, and consequent hierarchical stratification and stagnation. The worst case result is totalitarianism and widespread injustice. By "equality" in the traditional sense I mean the leveling of society—the reduction of stratification and of entrenched authority. Equality results in similarity of mutual rights and prerogatives among individuals, and hence in breaking down authority and social structure. The worst case here is the total dissolution of order and stable relations and roles, leading to anarchy, mob rule, and so forth. Monarchies establish orderly societies at the expense of equality. Democracies have allowed equality but cannot sustain order. Unification Thought considers "order" and "equality" both to be values necessary for a good society, and is unwilling to sacrifice either for the sake of the other. Then, what kind of society would Unification Thought prescribe, and how would it solve the conflict between "order" and "equality," between monarchism and democracy? That is, how would Unification Thought envision a society wherein both equality and order are maintained? To discuss this problem, I will first explain some fundamentals of UT with regard to the nature of the good society. I will then utilize two classic expressions of the monarchic and democratic theories, those of Robert Filmer and John Locke. I will summarize Locke's definition of and argument for democracy, point out some problems with Locke's theory, and present some insights within UT which may lead to solution of these problems. I will do the same with Filmer: present his definition of and argument for monarchism, point out some problems with Filmer's theory, and evaluate from the perspective of UT. As a conclusion I will offer some implications of my study for the development of Unification social ethics.

The Unification Thought Concept of the Good Society

I will begin by citing relevant passages in the summer 1989 draft of Unification Thought (UT, 1989; page references to chapter six, "Ethics").

The future ethical society is a society where all human beings become brothers and sisters, and where people love one another centering on God's love. (UT, 1989, 1)

This indicates that UT is an idealistic, "utopian" theory, which presupposes a fundamental change in human character, namely, the elimination of sin, the universal practice of true (altruistic) love. This essay, then, presupposes the solution to the problem of alienation, crime and sin. It is an attempt to envision the society which would have come about had there been no human fall.

God created man as the object of love, and God's love appears more completely through the family than through the human individual. (UT, 1989, 2)

This indicates that the UT social ideal takes as its fundamental unit the family, not the individual. The family is prior to the individual, and the protection and enhancement of family life is more important to the happiness of society than is the enhancement of individual life *per se*. The rights of the family supercede the rights of the individual.

When a husband and wife horizontally love each other centering on God's vertical love, a child comes to be born, in which a family quadruple base is established that consists of the four positions of father (husband), mother (wife), and children centered on God in a family. We can also see that the family quadruple base is established with grandparents, father and mother, and children. (UT, 1989, 2-3)

Thus, the family is defined as three generational (four generational or more depending upon the longevity of the elders and the length of generational cycle).

For each position of the family quadruple base, there are three

objects. . . . The realization of the three objects purpose is to realize God's love toward the three objects.

Social structure begins with family structure (the three objects purpose), which itself is rooted within the UT cosmological structure. "Love," the power of unification, in itself undifferentiated, is differentiated as it manifests within this fundamental structure. UT refers to this as "divisional love," as follows

Since God's love is absolute love, it is divisionalized, and is expressed as divisional loves according to the position in the family quadruple base and direction. Divisional loves are basically the three kinds of love of parental love, conjugal love and children's love. Parental love is a downward love going from the parents to children, conjugal love is horizontal love between a husband and wife, and children's love is an up-ward love going from children to parents. In this way the divisional love is a love with direction. More accurately speaking, love has twelve directions, for in the four positions of the family quadruple base, each of them has three objects purpose. Consequently, various kinds of love which have different nuances come to appear. And in realizing each kind of love, virtues corresponding to each of them come to be required. (UT, 1989, 2-3)

Thus, all social or civic virtues are extrapolated from the three kinds of love within the family. As UT states, "human relationship in society is the direct expansion of the relationships of the members of the family." (UT 1989, 7) These three kinds of love, with their expansion into twelve kinds and beyond, are called "divisional loves." All the virtues necessary for the healthy functioning of society are thus grounded in family life experience, which in turn is grounded in the nature of God and the order of creation. The development of virtue begins with inner virtues connected with the perfection of the individual per se. UT names some of these virtues: "purity, honesty, righteousness, temperance, courage, wisdom, self-control,

endurance, independence, self-help, fairness, diligence, innocence, etc." (UT, 1989, 6-7) UT explains further :

Family ethics can be seen as the foundation of all ethics. If family ethics is applied to society, it will be the social ethics; when it is applied to an enterprise, it will be the enterprise ethics [business ethics]; and when it is applied to the state, it will become the state ethics [political ethics]. (UT, 1989, 7; my interpretation within the brackets)

The particular "vertical" virtues referring to the political realm in UT are "love" from the government or ruler to the people, and "respect" from the people to the government or ruler. (UT, 1989, 7) The "horizontal" virtues are named as "reconciliation, tolerance, justice, fidelity, courtesy, modesty, mercy, cooperation, service and sympathy." (UT, 1989, 7-8)

Ethics comes to be established in the positions of love, or, in (the system of) order. In other words, ethics cannot be established apart from (the system of) order. (UT, 1989, 5)

Thus, UT addresses the question of order, without specifying the nature of the "system" to which it refers. "The family [is] the basis for the system of order for the society." (UT, 1989, 5)

... the family is a microcosmic system miniaturizing the entire system of the universe. The law penetrating the entire universe is indeed the way of Heaven, and it is also called reason-law. The norm in the family, namely ethics, is the way of Heaven governing the universe, directly manifested through the family (system). (UT, 1989, 6)

Here the term "system" appears again, and again without elaboration other than its close linkage to the family and to nature, the "entire system of the universe." We also find connection to

the classical Stoic notion of "reason-law" underlying all things, indeed governing all things. But unlike the Stoics, UT maintains that the heart of God pervades the system of reason-law, and provides that system its value.

Love and heart are the highest values, the greatest powers, of the creation and of God himself. Therefore, the greatest aspiration of each person is to achieve oneness with God's love and heart, and the essential "equality" we desire has to do with the realm of love and heart. On this foundation, UT addresses the problem of the theoretically (and historically) conflicting values of order and equality. The first step is to define the meaning of equality :

When we look from the Unification Thought perspective, the Principle equality is the equality in love, and equality in personality. The equality which man is truly seeking is the equality of children under our Father God's love. It is the equality in which God's love is given equally to all men, just as the light of the sun is equally shed to all beings. Therefore, the Principle equality is equality given by God, the Subject, and not equality which man, the object, can take as he (or she) likes. (UT, 1989, 10)

Now, Jesus used the same analogy : the sun shines equally on the good and the evil. The problem is that not all people experience God's love equally. The issue facing us is the establishment of a system of society (government) which will serve as the condition for, and be the result of, the equal subjective experience of God's love among all people. UT refers to this equality of subjective experience as "the repletion of love," in the following passage :

God's love is expressed divisionally through the order. Therefore, the equality in love is the equality through the medium of order. Equality in love (or equality of love) through the medium of order is the equality in the repletion of love, namely the equality given when love is repleted in each one of the people in their respective positions and their

respective personality (in their personal capacity). The repletion of love brings one satisfaction and joy. Therefore, the Principle equality is the equality in satisfaction, and in joy.

Such repletion of God's love will be felt by man only when he possesses an object consciousness—the heart to attend God, or the heart to be grateful to God. Unless man possesses the object consciousness, no matter how great God's love may be, he could not feel repletion, but would feel dissatisfaction. (UT, 1989, 10)

Thus, the social problem reduces to one of human consciousness in relationship to God, in give and take with the person's positional relations in society. UT implies that equality refers to each individual's relationship with God, and an individual's relationship with God is mediated in praxis with other people in the social world. "God's love is expressed divisionally through the order" means that proper structure of human relations is a base, or a condition, for God's love to be received by all individuals, if they each fulfill their portion of responsibility. Thus, human equality is realized by human beings living in the correct social relationships, i.e. the proper order. Thereby order and equality are reconciled, and in fact can never appear separately. The theoretical problem thusly is solved (the historical problem is a matter of application, the purpose of philosophy being to change the world).

This proper order is the expansion of the family. UT does not specify the external result ; by "expansion of the family" it specifies only that "in the relationship between two persons with twenty or more year difference of age, the older loves the younger as if the latter were the former's children and the younger respects the older as his or her father or mother. If the difference is ten years or less, the older loves the younger as his or her younger brother or younger sister, and the younger respects the older as his or her older brother or older sister." (UT, 1989, 7)

Implications of this UT theory will appear through discussion of the theories of Locke and Filmer.

John Locke

John Locke was an English philosopher, physician to the Earl of Shaftesbury, the founder of the Whig party, and an associate of the exiled court of William of Orange. Locke developed his political philosophy in this milieu, and published his "Two Treatises of Government" shortly after William's acquisition of the throne of England through the graces of Parliament in 1688. Locke considered equality the measure of the goodness of society, with the ideal ultimately pure equality on a par with the "state of nature." For Locke, equality meant equality of rights, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; . . . without subordination or subjection, . . . This equality of men by nature . . . [is] beyond all question . . ." (II, 4, 5). Our equality is the basis for the "duty, to love others than themselves." (II, 5) Thus, equality is prior to love, where love means doing good to others because, since they are our equals, they must have the same desire (to be treated well) that we have. "Being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker . . . they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any . . . subordination among us . . ." (II, 6) Thus, God made us equal, therefore we should love each other. We are all God's property; therefore we can never be each other's property. Again, equality is prior to love.

Locke defines "political society" as that community of men each of which has signed over his right to judge and punish offenses against his person or property, to the common society according to a rule of law and judicature. (VII, 87) By the power of a monarch, Locke means "absolute power" to judge and punish according to no other authority than the monarch's own will.

Locke differentiates political society from "conjugal society," which includes husband, wife, children and servants. The purpose of conjugal

society is the "continuation of the species." (VII, 79) The marriage bond is sacred only to the extent that for biological reasons the parents must raise their children and provide for their inheritance. (VII, 80) Locke viewed marriage as a legal contract between a man and woman, which interfaces with political society when entering upon and dissolving the contract. (VII, 83) The father has no political authority over his family.

Though the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age; and though that honor and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their parents all their lifetime and in all estates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing—i.e., making laws and exacting penalties on his children— (VI, 74)

Thus politics deals with the question of authority: the power to punish, for the sake of protecting persons, property and the civil rights of all.

Criticism of Locke, and the UT Response

In the view of UT, the Lockean political philosophy is mistaken. The UT understanding of the original human condition differs from Locke's. Locke viewed the original society as a collective of independent individuals; UT, based upon the Divine Principle interpretation of the Bible, views our origin as from a family of an original couple. For UT, society emerges from the family, biologically. For Locke, society emerges from the collective of individuals, politically. As a result, the UT understanding of the terms "equality" and "rights" are different from Locke's. These terms are defined within the context of the family ideal in UT. Social equality and rights exist only within the context of the family order. Individuals are not "free," in other words, to determine the nexus of their social, much less familial, relations. Therefore, the UT understanding of

political society, and its relationship to the biological (natural) order, has implications different from Locke's.

For a schematic representation of salient divergencies between UT

U T	Locke
Biological connections, organic, natural relations are primary	Human independence of each other; contractual realations are primary
God is Father, primarily	God is owner, primarily
Dominion of parents based upon love; is eternal	Dominion of parents based upon obligation; is temporary
Exalts family; finds love and joy there	Repudeates family; finds troubles and burdens there
Adam and Eve born as infants, hence a model for growth	Adam born adults and perfect, hence no model for growth
Government an order of creation (an expression of true love)	Government a result of sin (to regulate selfish love)

and Locke, see the figure above.

The significant problem for Lockean democratic theory is the relationship of political society to human existence as biological creatures, the order of the family. For Locke, the family was incidental to the creation of society. Parents are responsible for their offspring to the age of maturity, after which there is no binding relationship between parent and child. The child must independently

choose to enter the political society at that point. Because social life in Lockean democracy is voluntary and hence is political in nature (i.e. subject to consent, based upon negotiation), an individual's position in society is not determined by familial (i.e. biological) connections, but by his/her will. Thus UT would join the traditional criticism that Locke "[makes] the solitary individual the pivot of all your thought." [Barker, xix] In fact, as has been pointed out [Barker, xx], although Locke exalts "natural law," the implications of his theory allow no real existence to any "state of nature" per se: "Locke's state of nature, with its regime of recognized rights, is already a political society." It is a world of genderless, family-less adults, free-floating atoms with no prior or posterior biological relationships or responsibilities. (Of interest to Unificationists would be the similarity of this world with the angelic world.)

We can question Locke's theory at the point at which individuals transfer from the conjugal society (the order of nature) to the political society. Locke theorizes that each person enters into the political society through active consent, but admits that most enter through tacit consent, i.e. simply by accepting the law and conventions and remaining in the territory. In actuality, most people involve themselves with civil society because they have accepted it as a necessary arrangement. There is no real "consent" to the rightness of it, any more than there is "consent" to the rightness of the family by a child. Locke's "tacit consent" is a euphemism for human enculturation into the given order, which we actually accept, albeit often uncomfortably, as "natural." That is, most people consider their own culture to be natural and absolute. The child naturally accepts the conditions of family life; so too the adult naturally accepts the conditions of their historical social life. It is not a decision reached through reason or judgement; it is not a political act, in the Lockean sense. Therefore, Lockean "political society" is a myth.

Locke's bifurcation of conjugal society (as involuntary) and political society (as voluntary) is fallacious. The only "members" of a Lockean political society are those who actively choose to be so: mainly politicians. Politics is a voluntary association. No individual can really dissociate from society (without leaving the

territory). Those who do not depart remain part of the political system-as criminals. Similarly, no individual can dissociate from his family. One is always the child of one's parents; one is always the product of one's nation.

This is to criticize Locke for his ignoring the role of culture in the formation of government, which is analogous to the role of custom and tradition in the functioning of reason. Custom and tradition have an organic, historical life, the essence of which is transmitted through our families. We do not abstract ourselves from this environment and suddenly become a historical, calculating beings of pure reason upon reaching adulthood, beings who can now enter into a wholly separate dimension of life called political society. Political life is one aspect of the social complex, which includes culture, economics, morality, religion, technology and so forth. Culture is relatively natural; there is not much optional behavior within the realm of culture, in the sense that it is not an option that the businessman wear tennis shorts and not a suit to the office. The absolute, changeless entity through which all varieties of culture are maintained is the family.

Locke separates political society from the law of nature; he must, because the family is an order of nature, therefore since political society is divorced from conjugal society, political society is divorced from nature. UT solves this problem by presenting a new understanding of the "law of nature," which integrates the family with the larger society, and hence human society with nature. The purpose of the family and larger society are the same: the fulfillment of human joy and divine joy. Adults who create the larger society are all involved with a family simultaneously. If the family is an ideal one, then the adults will be happy and satisfied; they will be equal in joy and satisfaction through objectivity to God's love.

Equality has its basis in the family, not in the larger social institutions *per se*. Individuals equal in joy and satisfaction under God in the family will naturally create just conditions in their larger society. They will never desire to hurt their neighbor, they will only desire to work for their neighbor's benefit, and to relate according to the expression of divisional love. Therefore, political society as

Locke defines it is unnecessary, because there would be no need for laws, a judge, and punishment.

Another weakness with Locke's theory is that it places absolute authority, that over life and death, in human hands according to human conventions. A society governed by human convention can never be a stable one, because human beings can always question what other human beings have decided, even by rule of majority. Refusing consent, tacitly or otherwise, any person can choose to live "outside the law," to a greater or lesser degree. Without an absolute standard, an authority above the human level, there will never be real stability or order.

UT establishes absolute value within the family, centering upon the love of the husband and wife. From this emerges the absolute value of parental and children's love, and from this is established the many virtues necessary for and manifested through a healthy society. For Locke, the relationship of husband and wife was relative to the procreation of children; once that was accomplished fully (to the point of inheritance of property) marriage had no further meaning or value. Thus, Locke identified no absolutes. His highest values are the independence and equality possessed in the (theoretical) state of nature. Neither of these are absolutes. Independence exists relative to things or persons to which I could be dependent, and equality relative to the status of other individuals or groups.

Locke failed to recognize that we exist in a relational cosmos; he was a child of the Newtonian world view within which things can affect each other without being affected by them; in which position, time and velocity were considered absolutes. The Newtonian cosmos has been long superceded by an explanation which takes as its starting point relationship (that is, relativity). This has enlightened us as to the physical cosmos; now it must be applied to social theory as well.

Within a relational cosmos, the absolute could possibly be nothing other than relationship itself. The central relationship of the world is that complex of God, husband and wife; in that relationship all relationships in heaven and on earth connect, balance and harmonize.

Therefore, the center of order (stability, unchangeability) can be only the conjugal society, the family.

The family is the hermeneutic for society in UT; in Locke, the political society is the hermeneutic for the family. The family's purpose in UT is to be the foundation of love and joy, and marriage is eternal because love is eternal. Property is shared; possession is not a legal matter. The family became for democratic societies a private legal institution, a producer of citizens, from which individuals separate upon reaching political responsibility.

UT has a fundamentally different anthropology grounding this different view on the family. Love for others, in Locke, is rooted in self-love. We love others because we recognize them equal to ourselves; therefore we should love them as we love ourselves. Love for others in UT is a power-in-itself; in fact UT is opposite to Locke: self love is rooted in love for others.

Since love for others is a given in UT, and since for Locke civil (political) society arises solely to protect us from the malice of others, political society in the Lockean sense is not a part of the original society. What is left in Locke's theory, then, is "conjugal society."

Locke does not "expand" the model of conjugal society, because he sees political society as fundamental and conjugal society as an exception to the rule, almost an aberration, subsisting in each person's life temporarily in order to maintain the species. He does not grant conjugal life a vitality or integrity of its own, and sees it only as a vehicle for creating and educating individual persons, and maintaining in an orderly way the ownership of property through the generations. For UT, these functions of family life are the external, or *hyung-sang* functions. Locke does not recognize the internal, or *sung-sang* element of family life, centering upon love. Locke views the family only from the perspective of his political theory, and therefore confines its meaning within political terms and dissolves its significance upon the fulfillment of its biological and economic functions. This narrow view was necessary for Locke because of his political agenda on behalf of the 1688 Parliamentary revolution. The family is the one component of society in which

equality, according to Locke's definition, that is, political equality, can never come about. Therefore he defined the family simply as the vehicle to bring people into the political society.

Further, Locke (in his writings, at least) did not appreciate family life. To care for their children is the parents' "duty which is incumbent upon them" until the children become reasonable individuals who can "ease [their parents'] of that trouble." (VI, 58) For children to honor their parents is an "obligation" set upon them by "the law of God and nature." (VI, 66) To mitigate this severity, Locke adds that "God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their offspring that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigor," (VI, 67) which illustrates that what UT places as primary, Locke places as secondary. The question is not that Locke or UT exclude facts of reality, but is in each's identification of first principles, and the implications thereof.

The western democracies today evidence these weakness of the Lockean theory upon which they based themselves. The family has collapsed, and men and women view it mainly as a contractual bond which can be broken if the terms are not met, through the judgement of a court of law. Thus, the alienation to the public sphere of the citizens' rights to judge and punish those who infringe upon their person or property has extended to include marriage and family relations. The family has become politicized. Therefore, the family is not viewed as an order of nature, as a necessary human relationship. With the collapse of the family is coming general social collapse, and the failure-from within of western liberal democracy.

Robert Filmer

Robert Filmer was an English aristocrat who lived a generation prior to Locke, during the period just preceding the Puritan revolution. He was an apologist for the throne, as Locke was later to become for the Parliament. Locke's second treatise was obviously preceded by a first, a treatise which is very difficult to find these days. Locke's first treatise was his critique of Filmer. Soon after

Locke, Filmer's writings were forgotten. However, by summarizing Filmer, we can see that there is a significant theoretical alternative to Locke in the western tradition.

Filmer leveled devastating criticisms of the democratic theorists of his day for grounding authority in human convention or the human will. Peter Laslett, an authority on both Locke and Filmer, states that no one, Locke included, has answered Filmer's criticisms of democracy, a fact worth pondering in relation to the obscurity of Filmer's name and works.

Filmer presented a definition of monarchy and argument in its favor. He argued from the assumption of the existence of original parents to the human race, Adam and Eve. God gave to Adam dominion over his wife and children. Adam represented God and therefore was the Lord of creation. This dominion of Adam included his grandchildren and all his descendants. Thus, Adam was the progenitor and King of the entire human race, his lineage.

The basis and justification of Adam's authority was the biological fact of procreation. Thus, in Filmer's view, human beings are born into a social context established by biological bonds of nature. Filmer argued that fatherhood is the only true authority which exists in nature. Thus, all authority begins with the family. He argued that political authority must be derived from and consistent with the natural linkage of persons created through family and kinship, which, for him, was the order given by God through nature. For Filmer, the origin of political authority can be nowhere else than God. Implicit in Robert Filmer's theory is a plea for order, for his purpose was to argue against the idea that mankind is "at liberty to choose what form of government it please, by human right bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude." (I) There is but one form of government, according to Filmer, and that is the original form given by God through nature, in the family :

I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man else, can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subordination of children is the fountain of all regal authority, by the ordination of God himself. From whence it follows, that

civil power, not only in general is by Divine institution, but even the assigning of it specifically to the eldest parent. (III)

Filmer argues further how this sovereign power is "absolute" in its authority over life and death. His arguments to this end are all from the Old Testament. "This lordship which Adam by creation had over the whole world, and by right descending from him the Patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolutist dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation." (III) The rights of the monarch are, writ large, "the right of the Father descended to the true heir." (V) Again, Filmer's primary reference is Genesis 1:28. (VIII) This is "the natural and private dominion of Adam [as] the fountain of all government and propriety... the power of Kings [derives] from the original dominion of Adam." (IX)

Filmer distinguishes the relationship between a master and servant, which is dissolvable, from that between a father and son, which can never be abrogated. The former is "servitude," which is contrary to the law of nature, because "no man is born a servant or subject to the power of a master by the law of nature, yet every man is born subject to the power of a Father." (X) Filmer challenges his opponent to teach us "how and when sons become free. I know no means by the law of nature." (XI) Thus, Filmer is arguing for hierarchical society only on the basis of family and lineage; inequality among persons on any other basis, be they social, political, economic, racial or coercive, is ruled out of court.

Criticism of Filmer, and the UT Response

Filmer thus does not fall prey to Locke's bifurcation of the natural order (the biological, the family) and the political order (the artificial, the state). Thus, Filmer is more consistent with UT than is Locke, on the hyung sang side. However, as does Locke, Filmer misunderstands the nature of parental authority.

First of all, Filmer grounds parental authority in the father alone. UT grants authority to the mother, unique but of the same

significance as the father's.

Second, in UT the parental authority is the authority of love, not of coercion (over life and death) nor by heteronymous fiat (the decree of God). Of course, for UT the decree of God is the precondition of parental authority as of everything. However, there is the substantialization of God's Word, in the parental love, which UT asserts as natural and necessary. In fact, and this is the key to the distinction between UT and Filmer, the first result of the human fall was that parental love became distorted; the original parents were unable to substantialize God's love to their children. Hence they had to rule by force and artificial authority, and their children were unhappy.

This is Filmer's key mistake: he did not understand the relationship of the human fall to the love of parents and consequently to the biological family and the social world. He accepted fallen parents as the norm, and granted absolute authority to fallen parents and approved of the actual prerogatives, such as the use of force, taken by fallen parents out of selfishness and the inability to give true love to their children.

Filmer's model was adduced from the fallen world, and is monstrous in some ways, given the selfish nature of men and women, in particular in their conjugal life. The model of king as ultimate father in the fallen world is at best a temporary fix and at worst a destructive lie. Because of the fall of Adam there were no true fathers in the world. No man could have dominion of true love over his wife, nor parents over their children. Fatherly dominion reduced to a matter of force, mental or physical. Similarly, there were no true mothers in the world. The wife's dominion over her husband was equally destructive and evil. The fact of royal authority passed through lineage was well dispensed with centuries ago; no need to glorify, protect and perpetuate the lineage of evil. Locke's solution is arguably the best possible if one accepts the conditions of the fallen world and seeks accommodation.

When the parents fail to create harmony and justice, the brothers must fend for themselves, dismissing the possibility of the rule of love, and placing abstract reason in its stead. The rationalistic, and

many would say heartless, world of the English-speaking peoples was the result.

UT solves this problem by setting the perfection of individuality as the precondition to marriage and family life. Husband and wife thus are to be individuals of selfless love, who can mediate and incarnate God's love to each other and to their children. It is implicit in UT that the children naturally, voluntarily, love their parents and will never want to separate. Within the realm of such love, brothers and sisters love each other and will never want to separate. Thus, true parental love is the precondition for the brotherly agreement upon which Locke bases his hopes. Within such a society, naturally the eldest couple will represent God's authority of true love. This will be the world of God's original intention, governed by God's love, in which equality of joy and satisfaction, and the order of the Heavenly way, are both realized in their fullness.

Conclusion

I base the critiques of both Locke and Filmer upon their faulty conceptions of family life: for Locke, its relationship to society; for Filmer, the spiritual responsibility of the parents. Thus UT is borrowing the emphasis in Locke on the need for personal responsibility and integrity to supplement Filmer, with reference to the responsibility of men and women to become perfect as God is perfect (Mt. 5:48) prior to entering into marriage. UT also borrows the emphasis in Filmer to supplement Locke, with reference to the grounding of social authority and equality within the order of nature, centering on the family.

As does Filmer, Unification Thought grounds political authority in the order of nature, specifically the family. "The family system is a microcosm, or an integration of the whole universe. The ethical standard within the family, therefore, can be looked upon as the contracted, or integrated cosmic law [Heavenly Way]." (*Explaining Unification Thought*, p. 237) UT proceeds to outline the foundation for order in society as equality of love. That is, all people have the "right" to love and be loved. If that right is satisfied, then all people

will feel true joy. "Though everyone is expected to maintain his own position, yet they feel joy and satisfaction in that particular position." (Ibid., p. 239) Equality substantially refers to "equality of satisfaction" and subsequently to equality of "love, personaly, joy, and happiness." (Ibid., p. 240)

Implicit in Unification thinking is that the origin of love spiritually is God and substantially is the parents. Therefore, all persons attain their fundamental equality through their own family life. Thus the core of democracy is the institution of the heavenly family. From the seed of true love between husband and wife the family is created. The family indeed is the extension or expansion of that love, spiritually and physically. Similarly, the clan is the extension or expansion of the family love, the society of the clan love, the nation of the societal love, and the world of the national love. For instance, a world is created when the nations are living for each others' sake, as brothers and sisters. True love naturally, inexorably expands from the individual to the world level.

UT provides the tools with which to work out the practical shape of the Christian ideal of the City of God; that is, the society in which God-centered love is realized. Augustine could not work this out, because he had no basis to recognize that the true family is the link between the Kingdom of Heaven in the spirit (or in hope) and the Kingdom of Heaven in reality on earth. Since God is present equally in all families, because true love is absolute, each family is absolute, has absolute value. The civil rights Locke would attribute to the individual, UT would attribute to the family. The individual is not absolute, because God is not fully present in the individual. God is fully present, however, in true marriage and family life. God, thus, is revealed as dynamic and creative in the ultimate, human sense. Each family is the relative and complete center of absolute love, truth, goodness and beauty. Individuals who compose such families are naturally persons of true love, who, in Christian terms, live according to God's spirit and are beyond the law. Augustine said that for such people, laws (and government in the Augustinian sense, to control sin) are not necessary. Why? because the person living by God's spirit will naturally act for the benefit of others

and of the whole society. Such persons naturally will give more than they receive. A society in which all persons are giving more than they are receiving is overflowing with wealth, spiritually, culturally and economically. Because all people are doing this out of their own true desires, and not because there are laws telling them to do it, this would be a society of absolute freedom and perfect order.

To borrow a doctrine from Adam Smith, in a society of absolute freedom, in which all persons are working for their own benefit by serving the needs of others, the "invisible hand" of God would establish order (balance, structure, networks, positions and relations). The basis of order, I would propose in UT, is not human reason, negotiation, contract, constitution and calculation, but is true love. (Reason, etc., are still active on the hyung sang level—as powers of the original mind, but they are serving a principle of love, not self-interest.) Therefore, the Unificationist practical agenda is not to design an ideal social order, but to become ourselves persons of true love who can create ideal families.

On this count, UT resonates with John Locke. Locke viewed persons upon reaching maturity entering into the social contract as responsible individuals. UT views persons upon reaching maturity entering into the blessing and marriage as responsible individuals.

Entrance into marriage is also entrance into society, for UT. Thus, family life and social life are inextricable. The responsibility of individuals as such is first to become responsible members of the family order, through ideal marriage, thus inheriting God's true love, which is the basis for equality. Second, and on that foundation, individuals are to act responsibly as members of society, establishing good social order through the practice of the virtues extrapolated from true love within the family.

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Session I : Comment

Richard L. Rubenstein

Professor of Religion,
Florida State University, U. S. A.

Dr. Tyler Hendricks has written an illuminating paper, not only on the social ethics of Unification Thought, but also on the philosophical and spiritual origins of the crisis of the modern family. However, as Dr. Hendricks points out, Unification thought is "an idealistic, 'utopian' theory, which presupposes a fundamental change in human character, namely the elimination of sin" It is that crucial characteristic of Unification thought concerning which I find myself unable to form any image. I greatly admire Rev. Moon, but the world in which I dwell is the unredeemed world of the Fall. I have devoted much of my career to the study of the violence perpetrated by men and women in the twentieth century, so much so that in darker moments it can be said that I am an authority on the unhappy subject of genocide and mass murder. Even within the framework of Jewish theology, I have taken a position which rejects the moderate optimism of normative Jewish theology concerning human nature, arguing for a Jewish equivalent of the Calvinist version of the Christian doctrine of original sin. Moreover, while I concur with Dr. Hendricks concerning much, but not all, of what a good society ought to be like. At times, I am persuaded that the attainment of the good society may be a matter of incremental improvements over a very long period of time;